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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction lies with this court by virtue of Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) pursuant to the order of January 15, 1988 of
the Utah Supreme Court, pouring over this matter to this court.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion
to set aside judgment in favor of respondent, plaintiff below.
The judgment ordered against appellant was pursuant to Rule 37 as
a sanction against appellant for failing to obey a court order
regarding discovery and related litigation misconduct by
appellant and his counsel.

Furthermore, the Rule 60(b) motion

which is the subject of this appeal was the second such motion
filed by appellant and denied by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Were defendant's Rules 55(c) and 60(b) motions to

set aside timely?
2.

Is the instant appeal from the denial of defendant's

second motion to set aside barred under the doctrine of res
judicata due to defendant's failure to appeal the prior denial of
such a motion?
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing

to set aside defendant's default?
4.

Is defendant's notice of appeal timely?
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 37(b)(2)(C), Rule 55(c), Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules 4(a) and 4(b) of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court determine the outcome of this appeal. Due
to the length of these provisions, a text of each is set out in
the Addendum,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff initiated action against defendant Carl F.
Schettler on April 26, 1985-

(R. at 2)

In this action plaintiff

alleged fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of contract in connection with the defendant's submission of a fraudulent claim for
a stolen vehicle under his policy with plaintiff.

(R. at 28-48)

In response to plaintiff's claim, defendant brought a
counterclaim based on theories of defamation, bad faith, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, conversion, negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

(R. at 51-58)

Defendant's counterclaim sought damages in excess of $700 million.
(R. 51-58)
After prolonged litigation, including extensive
discovery, the trial court eventually dismissed defendant's
counterclaim against plaintiff on October 31, 1986.

The trial

court certified its order and judgment of dismissal as a final
judgment under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
at 722-25)

Defendant's appeal from the final order dismissing
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(R.

his counterclaim is a separate appeal pending before the Court of
Appeals; Case No. 880032-CA.

(R. at 771-72)

Prior to the dismissal of defendant's counterclaim,
plaintiff submitted various discovery requests calling for production of numerous documents, including defendant's personal tax
returns.

These requests were submitted on March 18, 1986 and

March 27, 1986.

(R. at 208-209 and 220-221)

Due to the defendant's failure to comply with plaintiff's
request for production of documents, plaintiff moved the court on
November 6, 1986 to compel production of the requested documents.
(R. at 745-46)

On December 1, 1986, defendant served upon

plaintiff a few documents pursuant to plaintiff's request for
production of documents.

(R. at 792)

Following a hearing on

plaintiff's motion to compel, the trial court on December 31,
1986, ordered defendant to comply fully with plaintiff's requests
for production of documents dated March 18, 1986 and March 27,
1986, within two weeks.

(R. at 803-04)

No further response to

the discovery requests was made by defendant after the trial
court's order compelling production.
On January 27, 1987, plaintiff moved for sanctions
pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for
defendant's continued failure to produce discovery and failure to
comply with the court's order of December 31, 1986.
808-09)

(R. at

Items of discovery to which defendant failed to respond
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included personal state and federal tax returns, interrogatories
which were unanswered, personal and business financial records,
flooring agreements, correspondence, business reports, copies of
tape recordings, personal and business net worth statements,
balance sheets, and other documents as set forth in plaintiff's
requests.

(R. at 816-30) Defendant filed no memoranda or

affidavits in opposition to the motion for sanctions or to
justify his failure to comply with the court's order of December
31, 1986.
At a hearing on plaintiff's motion for sanctions on
February 6, 1987, the trial court found defendant to be in
violation of its order compelling discovery.

The court also

found that defendant offered no justifiable excuse for its
failure to respond to the discovery in violation of the court's
order.

The court ordered defendant's answer to be stricken and

his default entered as a sanction pursuant to U.R.C.P. 37(b).
(R. at 878-79)
In May, 1987, the court upon consideration of affidavits
relative to plaintiff's damages, awarded judgment in favor of
plaintiff.

(R. at 1210-11, and 1223-25)

Later, the trial court

based upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause granted
the defendant an extension of time to file his notice of appeal.
(R. at 1509-11, and 1546-47)

Defendant eventually filed a notice

of appeal, appealing from the trial court's orders of December
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31, 1986, February 21, 1987, March 10, 1987, and May 6, 1987.
(R. at 1579)

That appeal is still pending before the Court of

Appeals in a separate appeal, Case No. 870488-CA.
On June 3, 1987, defendant moved the trial court
pursuant to Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to set aside the entry of default and default judgment.
(R. at 1524-26) Following oral argument on defendant's postjudgment motion, the trial court on June 24, 1987, denied
defendant's motion to set aside the entry of default and default
judgment.

Said order was signed and entered by the court on June

24, 1987.

(R. at 1574-75)

No appeal was ever brought from the

trial court's June 24, 1987 order denying defendant's first
motion to set aside.
Defendant later filed a second motion to set aside the
judgment pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure on June 29, 1987.

(R. at 1587-88)

It is from the

August 17, 1987 order denying defendant's second motion to set
aside that appeal is now brought.

(R. at 1890-91, 1895-96)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT]
Defendant's motions to set aside were untimely, and
therefore properly denied by the trial court.

Those motions, the

denial of which is the sole basis of this appeal, related to the
February 21, 1987 order that entered defendant's default.
Assuming arguendo that defendant's motions were timely filed, the
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record clearly demonstrates ample support for the trial court's
action in refusing to relieve defendant from the default judgment
entered against him for violating the court's order compelling
discovery.

Defendant has failed to present any evidence in the

record from which this court can determine whether there has been
error.

When appellant fails to present a record from which an

appellate court can determine whether there has been error,
failure to do so results in affirmance.
Denial of the defendant's second Rule 60(b) motion was
proper in view that the denial of defendant's first motion to set
aside was a final judgment, thereby precluding subsequent or
successive post-judgment motions to set aside.

The need for

finality at the trial court level, requires that the doctrine of
res judicata bar repetitive, piecemeal motions to set aside. The
filing of defendant's second 60(b) motion did not toll the time
in which defendant had to appeal from any of the trial court's
prior orders.

The result is that the notice of appeal in this

case was not filed within the required 30 days.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE WERE
UNTIMELY.
A.

Defendant's Rule 55 Motion to Set Aside the Entry of
Default Was Untimely.
Rules 55(a) and 55(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure clearly recognize that the entry of default and judgment
by default is a two-step process. However, once judgment by
default is entered pursuant to Rule 55(b), the entry of default
may be set aside only in accordance with the provisions of Rule
60(b).

See Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926, n. 4

(Utah 1982); and U.R.C.P. 55(c).
Defendant's June 3 motion was based upon an allegation
of "newly discovered evidence."

(R. at 1524)

Under Rule 60(b),

a court is empowered to set aside any final judgment, order, or
proceeding on the ground of newly discovered evidence within
"three months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken."
1986-

Defendant's default was entered February 21,

Defendant's 55(c) motion to set aside the entry of default

came more than three months after the order striking defendant's
answer and entering his default. As such, defendant's motion was
untimely.

I

Even assuming that the three-month limitation period
found in Rule 60(b) were not applicable to the defendant's June
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23 Rule 55(c) motion, defendant's motion should still be held to
be untimely.

The Restatement (Second) of Judgments §74 (1982)

provides:
[R]elief from a judgment will be denied if:
(1) The persons seeking relief failed
to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the ground for relief, or after such
discovery was unreasonably dilatory in
seeking relief. (emphasis added).
The authors of the Restatement, in commenting on the need for
promptly notifying a court of the basis for a motion to set
aside, stated:
In addition to acting diligently to discover
the grounds of relief, the applicant must act
promptly in seeking relief. The requirement
is cumulative with the requirement that
application be made within the time permitted
by applicable statute of rule of court . . . .
Thus, an application made within such a fixed
time limit should nevertheless be denied if
it was not made promptly after discovery of
the circumstances on which it is based.
(emphasis added).
Restatement (Second) of Judgment §74, comment e (1982).
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that a party
seeking relief from a judgment must establish that it acted with
due diligence in alerting the court of the grounds for setting
aside the default.

See Wilde v. Wilde, 669 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah

1983); Starzell v. Jaramillo, 663 P.2d 77, 78 (Utah 1983); and
Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431
(1973) .
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In American Metals Service Export Co. v. Ahrens Aircraft,
Inc., 666 F.2d 718 (1st Cir. 1981), the court was faced with a
similar dilatory request for relief by a party in default. In
American Metals, when the defendant failed to timely answer the
plaintiffs' complaint, plaintiffs moved for the entry of default,
which was entered on June 24, 1980. On August 28, 1980, the
magistrate entered an order to the effect that the complaint
would be dismissed if plaintiffs did not move for a default
judgment.

On September 2, 1980, one of the plaintiffs moved for

a default judgment.

A few days later defendant's president

mailed a letter to the magistrate in response to the plaintiffs'
complaint.
1980.

Judgment was entered by the clerk on September 8,

The judgment was satisfied in November, 1980, under threat

of attachment.

On February 3, 1981, five months after entry of

judgment, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment.
In affirming the lower court's refusal to set aside the
default judgment, the First Circuit noted that the defendant's
knowing inaction was sufficient grounds to deny his motion to set
aside:
We also think that the district court's
discretion may be guided by the moving party's "reasonable promptness" or dilatoriness
in seeking relief . . . .
In the present case, we see no abuse of
discretion in the court's weighing heavily
against defendant its five-month delay in
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seeking relief, particularly since a
judgment has been satisfied in the interim.
This unexcused delay alone is an adequate
basis for affirming.
Id. at 720-721. See also, Consolidated Masonry & Fire-proofing,
Inc. v. Wagman Construction Corp., 383 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1967)
(court refused to set aside a default due to the party's knowing
inaction over a two and one-half month period following the entry
of default); DeRyt v. DeRyt, 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 215 N.E.2d 698
(1966) (in an appropriate case latches would be a defense even if
the complaining party asserted his grounds within the time
prescribed by the Rules of Procedure).
Following the trial court's ruling of February 21, 1987,
defendant was fully aware that the entry of his default was the
direct result of his failure to produce documents pursuant to the
trial court's order of December 31, 1986, compelling production.
Yet, defendant took no action for more than four months to
correct the ruling he now claims was in error.

Defendant did not

offer any reason or excuse to the trial court for such delay, and
has not done so on appeal.

Under such circumstances the

defendant's June 29, 1987 motion to set aside should be found
untimely.
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B.

Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment
Was Untimely.
Defendant's June 29 Rule 60(b) motion to set aside

judgment is also untimely.

Although the motion purported to

relate to the judgment entered May 6, 1987, the motion in fact
attacked the order of February 21, 1987, where the trial court
ordered sanctions pursuant to Rule 37.
That the June 29 motion relates to the February 21st
order is shown by defendant's arguments to both the trial court
and this court.

Defendant does not attack the lower court's

findings awarding $98,579.24 in compensatory damages and $100,000
in punitive damages. Rather, defendant's motion attacks the
basis for the order which found sanctions under 37 U.R.C.P.
appropriate.

Specifically, defendant asserts that new evidence

came to light that shows he should not have been found in
violation of the December 27, 1986 order compelling discovery.
The "new evidence" consists of affidavits and deposition
testimony.

(See Addendum to Appellant's I?rief) The evidence

proffered by defendant, even if constituting "new evidence", goes
to the basis for the February 21, 1987 order striking defendant's
answer, not the May 6, 1987 judgment which merely set the amount
of damages.
Rule 60(b) was clearly available to defendant to seek
relief from the February 21, 1987 order striking defendant's
answer and entering his default.

U.R.C.P. 60 provides in part:
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
*

*

*

(b) . . . On motion and upon such terms as
are just, the court may in the furtherance
of justice relieve a party . . . from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (emphasis added)
The entire thrust of defendant's argument under his
60(b) motion goes to the order which found him in violation of
the order compelling discovery.

Defendant's contention is with

the February 21st order, not the May 6th judgment.

Since Rule

60(b) clearly can be used to set aside such orders, it must be
brought within "a reasonable time."

Where a motion to set aside

is premised on "newly discovered evidence", the motion must be
brought within three months after entry of the order.

The order

which defendant attacks was entered on February 21, 1987. The
motion giving rise to this appeal was filed on June 29, 1987,
more than four months later. The motion was untimely presented to
the trial court.

As such, the court committed no error in

denying defendant's second Motion to Set Aside.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S FILING OF SUCCESSIVE POSTJUDGMENT MOTIONS IS BARRED UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
The instant appeal is brought from the order denying
defendant's second motion to set aside.

The first motion to set

aside, dated June 3, 1987, was denied by the trial court on June
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24, 1987.

(R. at 1524-25, and 1574-75)

by defendant from that order.

No appeal has been filed

On June 29, 1987, rather than

appealing, defendant filed a second motion to set aside the
judgment.

(R. at 1587-88)

It is from the August 17, 1987 order

denying defendant's second motion to set aside that this appeal
is brought.

(R. at 1890-91, and 1895-96)

The Maine Supreme Court in Willette v. Umhoeffer, 268
A.2d 617 (Maine 1970), faced a situation similar to that
presented here.

In Willette, the defendant failed to timely

answer the plaintiff's complaint.

The defendant then brought a

60(b) motion, which was granted and the default set aside.
Plaintiff appealed, and the Maine Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's ruling on the post-judgment motion.

The defendant

then filed a new motion to set aside the default judgment, which
was granted.

The plaintiff appealed, contending that the

defendant was barred from bringing successive motions under Rule
60(b).
On appeal the Maine court agreed that a judgment cannot
be set aside on the basis of repetitive Rule 60(b) motions. The
court held:
We are here dealing with a judgment, not
appealed from, which must be accorded finality
under well-established rules unless relief
therefrom is afforded properly and seasonably for any one of the reasons set forth in
M.R.C.P., Rule 60(b). We are further dealing
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with the effect of a final decision on one
60(b) motion as it relates to the right to
pursue the attack on the judgment further
by means of successive 60(b) motions. The
principles underlying the doctrine of res
judicata have full applica-tion in such a
situation.
*

*

*

It is encumbent upon the defendant to
bring to the attention of the Court on his
first motion those issues bearing directly
upon his right to relief from judgment. He
could not reserve a portion of his alleged
grounds in order to lay the basis for suecessive motions seeking the same relief.
. . . . Although res judicata is ordinarily
applied to second independent actions
between the same parties . . . the principles upon which the doctrine rests have
equal application to successive attacks upon
a judgment . . . where all of the issues
were or could have been litigated on the
first motion. (emphasis added)
Id. at 618-619 (emphasis added).
A similar result was reached in Calhoun v. Greening,
636 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1981).

In Calhoun, the defendant sought to

set aside a default judgment obtained against him.

Defendant's

first Rule 60(b) motion was denied, and was not appealed.

In a

subsequent proceeding, defendant's second motion for post-judgment
relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) was also denied, and defendant
appealed.
Relying on the doctrine of res judicata, the Alaska
Supreme Court determined that the denial of defendant's first
Rule 60(b) motion was res judicata as to subsequent motions on
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those issues which were raised or could have been raised in the
initial motion.

The Alaska court stated:

[Defendant's] instant motion is his second
attempt to have the judgment against him set
aside. We believe that this motion constitutes a "subsequent action . . . upon the
same claim or demand . . -"
*

*

*

[Defendant's] second contention is that
his second motion raises issues not
addressed by his first. [The first] motion
simply asserted denial of due process, while
this motion claims a violation of Civil Rule
55(c). However, a fundamental tenant of the
res judicata doctrine is that it precludes
relitigation between the same parties not
only claims that were raised in the initial
proceeding, but also of those relevant
claims that could have been raised then.
[Defenant] had a full opportunity to present
his Rule 55(c) argument as part of his initial motion; his failure to raise it then
precludes him from raising it now.
Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
The Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the policy
considerations underlying application of the doctrine of res
judicata to successive post-judgment motions to set aside in
Sears v. Sears, 85 111.2d 253, 422 N.E.2d 610 (1981).

In Sears,

the court held that a second post-judgment motion was not
authorized, and explained:
Permitting successive post-judgment motions
would tend to prolong the life of a lawsuit
-- at a time when the efficient administration of justice demands a reduction in the
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number of cases pending in the trial court
-- and would then itself to harassment.
There must be finality, a time when the case
in the trial court is really over and the
loser must appeal or give up. Successive
post-judgment motions interfere with that
policy. And justice is not served by permitting the losing party to string out his
attack on a judgment over a period of
months, one argument at a time, or to make
the first motion a rehearsal for the real
thing the next month. In the interest of
finality, and of certainty and ease of
administration in determining when the time
for appeal begins to run, we reaffirm the
rule of Deckard that successive postjudgment motions are impermissible . . . .
Sears, 422 N.E.2d at 612-613.

See also, Reeves v. Hutson, 144

Cal.2d 445, 301 P.2d 264 (1956); Federal Lumber Co. v. Hanley, 515
P.2d 480 (Colo.Ct.App. 1973); Wright v. Fidelity Finance Co., 474
P.2d 232 (Colo.Ct.App. 1970); Palmer v. Jackson, 188 Ga. 336, 4
S.E.2d 28 (1939); Perkins v. Salem, 249 So.2d 466 (Fla.App. 1971);
Doslind v. Doslind, 678 P.2d 1093 (Hawaii Ct.App. 1984); Taber v.
Taber, 516 P.2d 987 (Kan. 1973); and Royal Coachman Color Guard v.
Marine Trading & Transportation, Inc., 398 A.2d 382 (Maine 1979).
The Utah Supreme Court's pronouncement in Mendenhall v.
Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287 (Utah 1980), suggests that the doctrine
of res judicata should apply to successive post-judgment motions
under Utah law.

In Mendenhall, the plaintiffs brought an

independent action pursuant to Rule 60(b) to set aside a
foreclosure judgment and the subsequent sale of certain
residential property to the defendant.
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Defendant moved for

summary judgment on the basis that the denial of a prior motion
to vacate the judgment was res judicata as to the plaintiffs in
the present case. The trial court granted the defendant's
motion, and plaintiffs appealed.
The Utah Supreme Court held that the denial of a 60(b)
motion to set aside a judgment is res judicata to a subsequent
independent action to set aside that judgment.

Id. at 1289. The

court's holding in Mendenhall that a party may not pursue one
post-judgment remedy to final adjudication and then pursue
another remedy, is analogous to the instant appeal.
The trial court's order of June 24, 1987, denying
defendant's First Motion to Set Aside, was a final appealable
order.

Denial of the first motion barred further consideration

of subsequent post-judgment motion by the trial court under
either Rule 55(c) or Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Defendant's remedy did not lie in further repetitious

and piecemeal motions to set aside.

Defendant's remedy was to

seek appellate review of the denial of his first motion. The
trial court did not, therefore, err in denvinq defendant's June
29 motion to set aside.

-17-

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT.
Trial courts are given considerable latitude of
discretion in ruling on motions to set aside default judgments.
See Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 1987); Katz
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986); Larsen v. Collina, 684
P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984); and Board of Education v. Cox, 14 Utah
2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, 807 (1963).

Since an application to set

aside a default judgment is equitable in nature, the trial court
is in the best position to determine the attendant facts and
circumstances'.

Cox, 384 P. 2d at 808. Absent a patent abuse of

discretion, an appellate court should not disturb the trial
court's ruling on a motion to set aside,

id. at 807; Katz, 732

P.2d at 93. Although some ground may exist to set aside a
default judgment, does not require the conclusion that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when the
attendant facts and circumstances support such a refusal. Katz,
732 P.2d at 93.
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in part:
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(2) Sanctions by court on which action
is pending. If a party . . . fails
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to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery 4 . . the court in
which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among
others the following:
* * *

(C) An order striking out pleadings
or parts thereof . . . or
rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party
In a civil case, the general rule is that a party who
refuses to respond to an order compelling discovery is subject to
the full range of sanctions available under Rule 37(b)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

First Federal Savings and Loan v.

Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984).

Speaking of the

purposes of sanctions pursuant to Rule 37, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated:
[SJanctions are intended to deter misconduct
in connection with discovery and require a
showing of "willfulness, bad faith, or fault"
on the part of the non-complying party. The
choice of an appropriate discovery sanction
is primarily the responsibility of the trial
judge and will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion.
An exception to the general rule exists when
a privilege is validly asserted. A court may
not ordinarily strike a party's pleadings if
the refusal to respond to a discovery order
is based on a valid claim of privilege.
Striking the pleadings is permissible, however,
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where there is an invalid refusal to obey a
discovery order.
First Federal Savings and Loan, 684 P.2d at 1266 (emphasis added).
In addition, unless an aggrieved party can demonstrate
that the trial court's action in entering sanctions pursuant to
U.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C) is without support in the record, it should
not be disturbed on appeal.

Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16

Utah 2d 97, 296 P.2d 410, 412 (1964).
Plaintiff submits that defendant's failure to cite to
any specific portion of the record on appeal should be construed
as an admission that the judgment of the lower court, striking
his answer and entering his default, was correct.

See Fackrell,

740 P.2d at 1319; Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987);
and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982).

Plaintiff

respectfully submits that the defendant failed to cite to the
record because there is no support in the record for the position
he took before the trial court, nor for the position he now takes
before this court.

In fact, the record gives ample support to

sustain the actions of the trial court in striking defendant's
answer and entering his default for willful and inexcusable
refusal to abide by the court's order compelling discovery.
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A.

The Trial Court Committed No Error in Finding That Relief
From the Final Judgment Under Rule 60(b) Was Not Available
to Defendant.
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs

relief of final judgment.

The only basis claimed by defendant on

appeal for relief from the judgment in the instant case is the
alleged discovery of "new evidence."

Under Rule 60(b)(2), a

party may be relieved from a final judgment where new evidence is
introduced "which by due diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for new trial under Rule 59(b)."
In Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993 (Utah
1982), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the requisite elements
for a 60(b) motion based on newly-discovered evidence:
(a)

There is material, competent evidence
which is in fact newly discovered;

(b)

By due diligence the evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at
trial; and

(c)

The evidence must not be merely cumulative or incidental but must be of
sufficient substance that there is a
reasonable likelihood that with it there
would have been a different result.

Id. at 995.
Defendant's proposed "new evidence" consists of the
deposition and affidavit of defendant's accountant, and the
affidavits of Sam Vong, Janet Reid, and Wayne Schoenfeld.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the affidavits and deposition
testimony offered by defendant as "new evidence," fails under
-21-

the test outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Doty.
The affidavits and deposition testimony offered by
defendant in support of his motion to set aside at the trial
level are not material.

Entry of judgment against defendant was

not based upon any evidence now sought to be controverted by
defendants "new evidence."

Defendant's default judgment was

entered as a result of his unjustified failure to comply with a
court order compelling discovery.

The affidavits and deposition

testimony do not even remotely pertain to the basis for the trial
court's action in striking defendant's answer and entering his
default.
1.

Affidavits of Sam Vong and Janet Reid.

The affidavits of Sam Vong and Janet Reid clearly could
have been obtained by defendant, and defendant alone, any time
prior to the trial court imposing sanctions under Rule 37.
Evidence that the Utah State Tax Commission and the Internal
Revenue Service do not have any records of tax filings by the
defendant from 1977 to the present surely must have been
available to defendant, upon due diligence, at the time of the
hearing on defendant's motion to compel on November 14, 1986,
nearly eight months prior to defendant's June 29 motion to set
aside.

At the very least, such evidence was available at the

February 8, 1987, hearing on plaintiff's motion for sanctions.
Defendant has failed to show that the affidavits of Sam Vong and
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Janet Reid were unavailable at the time of the trial court struck
his answer and entered his default.
Once again, it is important to recall that the personal
tax records of defendant were but a small portion of the entire
request for production of documents made by plaintiff.

Having

failed to establish that the evidence of the non-existence of tax
records was undiscoverable, defendant has failed to meet even the
most preliminary analysis required under the Utah Supreme Courtfs
holding in Doty.
2.

Affidavit of Wayne Schoenfeld.

The affidavit of Wayne Schoenfeld likewise fails to
measure up to the standard pronounced in Doty.

Under Utah law,

an affidavit must set forth facts that will be admissible in
evidence.

U.R.C.P. 56(e); and Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,

859 (Utah 1983).

The Utah Rules of Evidence require that a

witness testify only to matters within his or her personal
knowledge.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602. An affidavit based

on unsubstantiated opinions or beliefs is insufficient.
Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985).
The purported affidavit of Mr. Schoenfeld states that
the affiant believed that defendant, Carl Schettler, had no
knowledge of the whereabouts of his automobile.

This belief,

however, is not within the affiant's personal knowledge but
merely reflects his unsubstantiated opinion.
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As a result, the

"new evidence" provided by the affidavit does not conform to the
Utah Rules of Evidence, and is not competent evidence.
Additionally, the Schoenfeld affidavit contains hearsay.
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, hearsay "is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801.

Schoenfeldfs

affidavit includes statements made by Detective Mortensen of the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office to the affiant during the
defendant's trial.

Since these statements were not made by the

declarant, Wayne Schoenfeld, while testifying at the trial or
hearing, they are hearsay and as such are inadmissible as
evidence.
The purported affidavit is also incompetent since it
directly contradicts Mr. Schoenfeld's prior sworn testimony.
Evidence that would tend to merely contradict a witness' prior
testimony has been held insufficient to grant a new trial, even
though made by the defendant himself.

See Ghyselinck v. Buchanan,

13 Ariz. App. 125, 474 P.2d 844 (1970); and Aiken v. Protis, 59
Ariz. 101, 123 P.2d 169 (1942).
The Utah Supreme Court has considered the competency of
a contradictory affidavit where the affiant has given prior sworn
testimony.

In Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), the

plaintiff offered his affidavit to avoid summary judgment.
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The

affidavit was contrary to his prior deposition testimony on the
same issue•

The Supreme Court held that the affidavit could not

be used to defeat summary judgment where his deposition testimony
on direct and cross-examination supported summary judgment. The
Utah court in so ruling acknowledged the inherent reliability of
deposition testimony over affidavits:
As a matter of general evidence law, a
deposition is generally a more reliable
means of ascertaining the truth than an
affidavit, since the deponent is subject
to cross-examination and an affiant is
not. . . . But when a party takes a clear
position in a deposition, that is not
modified on cross-examination, he may not
thereafter raise an issue of fact by his
own affidavit which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation
of the discrepancy.
Id. at 1172.
Schoenfeld's affidavit contradicts his deposition.

(See

R. at 1562-63, and Deposition of Wayne Schoenfeld, pp. 39-40, R.
at 1174)

He has not provided an explanation for this discrepancy.

This contradictory evidence, in addition to being irrelevant, was
insufficient for the trial court to set aside defendant's default
judgment.
The affidavit of Schoenfeld likewise fails under the
Doty test since defendant cannot show that by due diligence the
evidence could not have been discovered and produced prior to the
time for the hearing on plaintiff's motiojji for sanctions. For
that matter, the defendant's own affidavit, offered in support of
-25-

the June 20 motion, demonstrates that the "new evidence" had been
available for a considerable time prior to the hearing on the
motion.

In fact, defendant has had three opportunities to

discover the same evidence.

Defendant had the opportunity to

cross-examine Mr. Schoenfeld during the defendant's preliminary
criminal hearing, at the subsequent criminal trial, and later at
Mr. Schoenfeldfs deposition in the instant case. As this "new
evidence" was not discovered during the course of this
litigation, due diligence has not been shown.
Assuming arguendo that the affidavit of Wayne Schoenfeld
contains "new evidence," it is clear that the evidence is of
insufficient substance to create a reasonable likelihood that the
defendant's default judgment would not have been entered.

As

previously stated, the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant was granted pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The fact that affiant Schoenfeld has

subsequently contradicted previous sworn testimony has nothing to
do with the entry of defendant's default judgment.

Thus, this

new evidence is incidental and does not present a reasonable
likelihood that with it there would have been a different result.
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3. Deposition Testimony of John Wilkins.
Defendant also claims that the deposition testimony of
John Wilkins, the defendant's accountant, constitutes sufficient
"new evidence" to warrant setting aside his default judgment.
Defendant's reliance on Mr. Wilkins1 testimony as a basis for
claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to set aside his judgment is unfounded.

Mr. Wilkins testified in

his deposition that he did not participate in the preparation of
any of the defendant's personal income tax returns.

The fact

that Mr. Wilkins did not assist the defendant in preparing his
personal income tax returns does not necessarily mean or imply
that the defendant did not file any tax returns. Nor does the
deposition of Mr. Wilkins establish any reason or excuse for
defendant failing to supply other documents sought in discovery
by plaintiff.

As a result, the deposition testimony of John

Wilkins is immaterial and of insufficient substance to create a
reasonable likelihood that with such evidence there would have
been a different result at the trial level.
B.

There Was Ample Basis for the Trial Court Striking
Defendant's Answer and Entering His Default.
Defendant hopes to restrict the court's review of the

facts that led the trial court to impose sanctions.

He argues

that the only basis for the sanction was his failure to produce
personal tax returns. However, the scope of defendant's disregard
for discovery rules and violation of the trial court's express
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orders is much broader.

The trial court's order of December 31,

1986 stated:
Furthermore, with a denial of defendant's
motion for summary judgment plaintiff's
motion to compel production of documents is
granted, defendant having two weeks from the
date hereof to fully and completely respond
to plaintiff's request for documents dated
March 18 and March 27 of 1986. (emphasis
added)
(R. 803-4)
It is undisputed that defendant did nothing further to
provide discovery subsequent to the court's order of December 31,
1986.

No further documents were provided, no further answers to

interrogatories were given and no affidavits were filed explaining
the reasons, if any, why discovery could not be provided.

In

effect, there was a total disregard of the court's order.
As a result of defendant's blatant disregard for the
trial court's order, sanctions were deemed appropriate pursuant to
Rule 37(b).
sanctions.

This conduct alone would have warranted the court's
However, at that point in the proceedings the trial

court had before it a history of repeated discovery abuse and
misconduct of the most outrageous nature by defendant and his
counsel.
This conduct by defendant and his counsel were the
subject of an earlier motion for sanctions which was heard in
August, 1986.

(See R. 340-341 and as more particularly detailed

in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, R. 360-382)
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Particular instances of misconduct during litigation included:
1.

A threat by defendant Carl Schettler against

witnesses Ruel Ware and Dorothy Ware during their depositions of
February 13, 1986.

(See Affidavit of Court Reporter, Lynne L.

Schinderling, R. 462-5)
2.

Mr. Wayne Schoenfeld, former manager of Pioneer

Dodge, Inc., testified that three or four weeks before his
deposition he was approached by defendant's attorney, Mr. Edward
Flint, who misrepresented himself as counsel for an insurance
company.

(See Deposition of Wayne Schoenfeld, pp. 102-3, R. 1174)
3.

Before the scheduled depositions of Mr. and Mrs.

Steven Smith in Tampa, Florida, defendant's counsel spoke by
phone with Mr. and Mrs. Smith and told them that if they consented
to give their deposition in Florida, he would subpoena them and
they would be compelled to come to Utah to appear at the trial.
As a result of these intimidating misrepresentations as to
subpoena power, the Smiths initially declined to give their
depositions.

(See Depositions of Jill Smith, pp. 29-33, R. 1148;

see also Deposition of Steve Smith, p. 33-35; R. 1149)
4.

Finally, and most egregious, there was testimony from

an independent witness, Mr. Troy Murdock, that in April, 1986,
shortly before he was to give a deposition in this matter, he was
picked up by defendant and his attorney and two other large
gentlemen, taken to a notary and coerced into signing a false
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affidavit.

The witness also testified that he was offered $1,000

by defendant in exchange for not appearing for his deposition.
(See Transcript of Hearing before Judge Dean Conder on April 14,
1986, R. 1677-1701; and Deposition of Troy Murdock, R. 1161)
As a result of the misconduct of defendant and his
counsel, plaintiff brought an earlier motion to strike pleadings
as an appropriate sanction.

That motion was still under

consideration by the trial court at the time of its ruling on
plaintiff's second motion for sanctions in February, 1987.
722-5)

(R.

Hence, the trial court had before it serious and repeated

attempts by defendant and his counsel to impede justice, suppress
evidence and fabricate false testimony through improper influence
of witnesses.

Given this entire history which defendant

carefully avoids in his brief, it is understandable and
commendable that the trial court would impose the most severe
sanctions authorized by Rule 37(b).
In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village,
Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court held that
default as a sanction is appropriate where the failure to respond
to discovery impedes the trial or frustrates the purposes of
justice and the determination of the validity of a defendant's
claims:
The sanction of default is justified where
there has been a frustration of the judicial
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process, viz, where the failure to respond
to discovery impedes trial on the merits and
makes them possible to ascertain whether the
allegations of the answer have any factual
merit. Id. at 738.
In the present case defendant's misconduct is far more
serious than that of the defendant in W. W. & W. B. Gardner. Even
disregarding defendant's attempt to coerce, intimidate and bribe
witnesses, he was in direct violation of the court's express order
of December 31, 1986.

In W. W. & w. B. Gardner, the defendant was

not in violation of such an order, yet the Supreme Court approved
default as a sanction.

Clearly the attempts by defendant to

frustrate the civil trial process were severe.

The record will

also reflect the trial was approximately one month away at the
time of the hearing on the motion for sanations.

(R. 801)

Fortunately, the courts of this state have seldom had to
deal with the type of litigation misconductt as involved in the
present action.

However, in a prior case also involving

litigation misconduct by a defendant, the Utah Supreme Court in
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah
1985), noted the importance of parties to a lawsuit complying
with the trial court's orders regarding discovery:
Were this court to allow such flagrant
disregard for properly constituted orders of
the lower courts, any defendant could avoid
his obligations simply by becoming
incommunicado. Id. at 1112«
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Although the court in Synergetics was dealing with the
defendant's repeated absence from the jurisdiction to avoid his
deposition, the principle it announced applies equally in the
present case.

In Synergetics, as in the present case, the trial

court imposed the sanction of defaulting a defendant for the
flagrant, inexcusable, and unjustifiable violation of an express
court order.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS UNTIMELY.
Defendant's notice of appeal purports to apply only to
the August 17, 1987 order denying defendant's June 29, 1987
motion to set aside. As shown in Point II, supra, successive
motions to set aside are unauthorized.

Denial of one Rule 60(b)

motion bars further Rule 60(b) motions under the doctrine of res
judicata.

When defendant's first motion to set aside was denied,

his sole remedy was to appeal from that order.

Defendant never

filed an appeal from the June 24, 1987 order denying his original
motion to set aside.

Defendant chose instead to file a

subsequent motion to set aside.
While defendant suggests that the trial court granted
him leave to file a second motion to set aside, he fails to point
to any support in the record for such leave.

Indeed, the record

on appeal demonstrates that no such leave was ever granted.

The

June 24, 1987 order denying the original motion clearly does not
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provide any support for defendant's allegation that he was
granted leave to file his June 29, 1987 motion to set aside.
Now on appeal, defendant contends that his June 29
motion stayed the time in which to appeal the denial of the first
motion to set aside.

The Utah Supreme Coijrt in Fackrell v.

Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987) clearly rejected the
proposition urged by defendant that the second motion to set aside
tolls the running of his time to appeal.

In Fackrell, the trial

court entered a child support order on April 14, 1983, requiring
the father to pay child support in accordance with the prior
decree of the court.

On May 6, 198 3, the defendant father filed

a motion to reconsider.

The motion was denied, and defendant

thereafter filed his notice of appeal.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court questioned the
timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by the defendant. The
defendant contended that his motion based jupon Rule 59 and Rule
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure extended the time in
which he could file an appeal from the court's prior final order.
The court noted that if the motion was treated as one under Rule
59, the motion was untimely since it was not filed within 10 days
of the April 14, 1983 final judgment.

In addition, the court

indicated that even under Rule 60, the defendant's notice of
appeal was untimely:
Treating a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) or
(7) likewise does not save ifhis appeal and
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prevents us from reaching the merits of the
trial court's original order. The Rule 60(b)
motion does not extend or toll the 30-day
period in which appeals in the original
action must be filed. See R. Utah S. Ct. 4(b).
We therefore cannot consider the father's
attack on the order refusing to modify child
support and decide only the issue of whether
it was error for the district court judge to
have rejected father's motion.
Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).
Defendant's sole remedy following the June 24 order
denying his original motion to set aside was to file a notice of
appeal within thirty days, as required by Rule 4(a) of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.
from the June 24 order.
60(b) motion.

Defendant failed to file any appeal

He elected instead to file another Rule

On appeal, defendant asserts that the second

motion tolled the time he had to appeal the earlier denial. Rule
4(b) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and the decision in
Fackrell reject such a conclusion.

Defendant had only until

July 27, 1987 to appeal the denial of his motion to set aside.
The instant appeal was not filed until September 14, 1987.
Defendant's appeal must therefore be dismissed as untimely.
CONCLUSION
The instant appeal, arising from the August 17, 1987
order denying defendant's second motion to set aside, is without
merit.

The June 29, 1987 motion was untimely.

In addition,

successive motions to set aside are not permitted.

Defendant's

failure to appeal from the denial of the first motion to set
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aside bars the instant appeal under the doctrine of res judicata.
Since defendant's second motion was improper, there can be no
abuse of discretion in denying such a motion.

Finally, defendant's

second motion to set aside did not toll the time in which he
could appeal from the trial court's earlier denial of defendant's
first motion to set aside.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully
submits that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's
June 29 motion to set aside.

The trial court's order should,

therefore, be affirmed.
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 37(b)(2)(C)
(b) Failure to comply with order
* * *

(2) Sanctions by court in which action is
pending. If a party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf
of a party fails to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery, including an order made under
Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a
party fails to obey an order entered under Rule
26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others the following:
* * *

(C) an order striking out pleadings or
parts thereof, staying further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party;
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 55(c)
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause
shown the court may set aside an entry of default
and, if a judgment by default has been entered,
may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b).
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 60(b)
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when,
for any cause, the summons JLn an action has not
been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is biised has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any'relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.

-A2-

RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, RULE 4(a) and RULE 4(b)
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order.
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the district court to the
Supreme Court, the notice of appeal required
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within 30 days after the date
of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from; provided however, when a judgment or
order is entered in a statutory forcible entry
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with
the clerk of the district court within 10
days after the date of entry of the judgment
or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the district court by
any party: (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b);
(2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration
of the judgment would be required if the motion
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend
the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new
trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall
run from the entry of the order denying a new
trial or granting or denying any other such
motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the
district court by any party: (1) under Rule 24
for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an
order, after judgment, affecting the substantial
rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the
order denying a new trial or granting or denying
any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed
before the disposition of any of the above motions
shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must
be filed within the prescribed time measured from
the entry of the order of the district court
disposing of the motion as provided above.
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LMED

LJOLEW
H.f.

S. BAIRD M O R G A N , 2314
MARK J. TAYLOR, 44 55
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone:
(801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
•

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO COMPEL

vs.
Ci^il No.:

CARL F. SCHETTLER,
1

Defendant.

C85-2687

Judge Richard Moffat

P l a i n t i f f , AMICA M u t u a l Insurance C o m p a n y , by and

through

its attorneys of record, hereby moves the above-entitled

court

for an order compelling d e f e n d a n t to produce documents as
in plaintiff's request for production of documents dated
1 8 , 1986 and M a r c h 2 7 , 1986.

In p a r t i c u l a r , said

March

requested

documents include defendant's personal state and federal
tax returns and personal networth s t a t e m e n t s , financial
ments and loan a p p l i c a t i o n s .

requested

Plaintiff submits said

are m a t e r i a l and relevant as establishing d e f e n d a n t ' s

income
state-

documents
income

and

assets in issue because of the claim for p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s .
DATED this

£ ^

day of N o v e m b e r , 19 8 6 .

A4
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S. BAIRD MORGAN'
~J
Attorneys for/piaijvtif f
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion to Compel was hand-delivered this

\D

day of November,

1986, to the following:
Phil Hansen
Attorney for Defendant
#800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
/^

^uO^G
A5

FILED IN CLfiAK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake City, Utah

JAN 5 1987
H Dixon Hindloy Clerk. 3rd Chst Court

By

K

(

^rT^ah
t^oi'ty&ierk

S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

>

ORt>ER

.I

Civil

vs.
CALR F . SCHETTLER,
Defendant.
Vj;

No.:

C85-2687

\ -muLL>

Defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion
to compel discovery having come before the above-entitled court,
the honorable Richard H. Moffat, District Court Judge presiding
and oral arguments on said motions having been heard on November
14, 1986 and S. Baird Morgan and Mark J. faylor of Strong & Hanni,
attorneys for plaintiff being present and Edward J. Flint, attorney
representing defendant being present and the court having heard
arguments and having granted parties additional time to submit
further legal briefs on the issues and said supplemental briefs
having been filed and reviewed by the court and the court being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now therefore;

^00503
A6

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's
motion for summary judgment is hereby denied.

Furthermore, with

denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment plaintiff's
motion to compel production of documents is granted, defendant
having two weeks from the date hereof to fully and completely
respond to plaintiff's request for documents dated March 18,
and March 27 of 1986.
Each side to
bear^its
respec^/ve costs
costs herein,
Each
to b
e a r i t s respective
herein.
DATED this

3 /

day ot^(j//^lm^L^^
BY THE COURTS

, 1.986,
!

ATTEST

^

H

D | X Q N

/
B f

^ X\ ^S ''/JJW

H | N D L E Y

CLERK

By—^LC^S^^_
deputy Clerk

/klChi&D H/#^FFAT
D i s t r i c t Cp)Art Judge
/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
„IJ-N

Order was mailed by first-class mail, postage prepaid, this
day of

Oi2>^Qrx^Qo^

Z>

/ 1986, to the following:

Phil Hansen
#800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant

L JQ ,U2A^ (V\n iHrrL ng

-2A7

^

O050&

JAN 28 iOcs^'3]

S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

^QMiau Jfiaihiu

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
MOTIO^I FOR SANCTIONS
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C85-2687

CARL. F. SCHETTLER,

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendant.

Plaintiff, Arnica Mutual Insurance Company, by and
through counsel of record, hereby moves this court, pursuant to
Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for sanctions
against defendant, Carl F. Schettler, for failure to comply with
this court's order dated December 31, 1986.

In particular,

plaintiff moves this court to strike defendant's answer and enter
judgment in favor of plaintiff as prayed for in plaintiff's
complaint.

This motion is supported by the attached memorandum

of points and authorities.

A4
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Dated this

£Cr - day of

, 1987.

Attorneys f
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this
V.

/M^/l/^i^s,

A. /

day of

' 1987f a true and correct copy of the foregoing

^

Motion for Sanctions was hand delivered to:
Phil L. Hansen
Edward L. Flint
Attorneys for Defendant
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mff<nr
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Sail Lake City Utah

FEB 2 3 1987
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

1

vs.

l

CARL F. SCHETTLER,

.,
,

Defendant,

^>RDER

Civi,l No. : C85-2687
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Plaintiff's motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure having come for hearing before
the above-entitled court on the sixth day of February, 1987, pursuant
to written notice and the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, District
Court Judge presiding and plaintiff being I represented by S. Baird
!

Morgan and Mark J. Taylor of Strong & Hanni, attorneys and defendant
being present in person and represented by Phil L. Hanson, attorney
and the court having reviewed the memoranda and pleadings of record
including the court's prior order of December 31, 1986 ordering
defendant to completely and fully produce documents including his
State and Federal income tax returns for the years 1977 through
the present and such other financial records and documents as request

*-j

A10
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in plaintiff's request for production of documents of March 18 and
27, 1986 and said documents not having been produced and no justifiable
excuse being offered by defendant for failure to produce said document:
and the court having heard oral argument of counsel and being otherwise
fully advised in the premises, now therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff's
motion to strike defendant's answer and enter defendant's default
is hereby granted.

The clerk of the court is hereby directed to

forthwith enter defendant's default in the above-referenced matter.
The present trial setting of March 10, 1987 is preserved but the
issues at trial shall be limited to the amount of damages to be
awarded plaintiff herein/
DATED this

^K /

ot^TJ^

day

,

1987.

ATTEST
H £>iXON HINDLE>
CLERK
deputy Cieri

^FAT
District Co/j/Jt Judge
CERTIFICATE OF HAND^-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order was hand-delivered this
to the following:
Mr. Phil Hansen
Mr. Edward Flint
#800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

-2All

day of

, 1987,

,E0 IH CLEM'S OFFICE
Fllj!

PHIL L. HANSEN (1343)
Attorney for Defendant
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2467

.P

JU|N

i| 4 5UPH *lll

H
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NDXlG$

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,

MOTION AND NOTICE FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
AND TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,

1 No. C 85-2687
CiVil

t

Defendant.
Defendant,

Carl F. Schettlerf by and through his counsel

of record, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60 (b) of the
Utan Rules of Civil Procedure does herewith move this court for
relief from the judgment entered in the above-entitled matter on
May 6, 1987, and to set the default judgment aside on the basis of
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been

discovered

in

time

to move

for a

new trial

under the

provisions of Rule 59 (fy).
DATED t h i s y ^ ^ y

V

of

, 1987.

PHI1TL. HANSEN
Attorney fcir Defendant

GO i >
A12
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NOTICE
TO THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL:
You, and all of youf will take notice that the Defendant's
Motion

and

Notice

for

Relief

from

Judgment will come on for trial on the
,1987 at the hour of

Judgment
\y&-

Q\fio fuw, before Judge

and

to

day of

Set

Aside

Ti,wr

|\\r\ fCe^-h

in the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah.

n

DATED this ^5>^aay of

Cl ° ^ - ^

1987.

PHIL L. HANSEN

>(VVS'
C,0
A13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION AND NOTICE FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, this

<IJ&- day of June,

1987, to:

S. Baird Morgan
Mark J. Taylor
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

• \
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~ > 1 v/^Sd/^lQ^S!^^
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

i

ORDER

i

Civil No.: C85-2687
Judge Richard H. Moffat

vs.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant.

Defendant's motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59, U.R.C.P.
and motion to set aside judgment of May 6, 1987 pursuant to Rule
60(b), U.R.C.P, having come before the above-entitled court for
hearing on the 12th day of June, 1987, and plaintiff being represented by S. Baird Morgan of Strong & Hanni and defendant being
represented by Phil L. Hansen, and the court having heard arguments
of counsel and considering the memoranda on file in this case,
including two affidavits of Wayne Arthur Schoenfeld dated May 20,
19 87 and June 11, 1987, now therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that defendant's
motion for a new trial is denied, and that defendant's motion to
set aside judgment entered May 6, 1987, is denied.

115

DATED

this 3f

1987.
ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY

day of

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order was hand-delivered this
Phil L. Hansen
#800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

day of June, 1987, to the following

84111
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FILED !N CLERKS RFFiCE
Salt 1 aka C-.w Utah

JUL 9

PHIL L. HANSEN (1343)
Attorney for Defendant
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2467

1987

H D:xcn HincJ'oy, Cl>*k

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

MOTION AND NOTICE TO SET
ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT

-vCARL F. SCHETTLER,

Civil No. C-85-2687
Judge Richard A. Moffat

Defendant.

Defendant, by and through h i s counsel of r e c o r d ,
moves t h e court for an o r d e r , pursuant to Rule 5 5 ( c ) , Rule 60(b)
and Rule 11 of t h e Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure, t o s e t a s i d e
t h e d e f a u l t e n t e r e d on May 6, 1987.

The d e f a u l t should be s e t

a s i d e because t h e testimony of d e f e n d a n t ' s a c c o u n t a n t , John
W i l k i n s , taken i n a d e p o s i t i o n by p l a i n t i f f ' s

counsel on

February 11, 1987, c o n s t i t u t e s new evidence and good cause
t h a t j u s t i f i e s r e l i e f from t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e judgment.

In

a d d i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f ' s motion for s a n c t i o n s was made without
r e a s o n a b l e i n q u i r y and for an improper purpose i n v i o l a t i o n of
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure*
The reasons s e t f o r t h for t h i s motion are s e t

forth

i n t h e a t t a c h e d memorandum and a f f i d a v i t s as f i l e d h e r e i n ,

A17

and on the pleadings, papers, records, and files in this
action.
DATED this ^ft^-day of June, 1987

u*

ILL. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendant

-^

NOTICE
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment will come on for
hearing on the 31st day of July, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.,
in the courtroom of the Honorable Richard A. Moffat, Third
District Court Judge, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
DATED this ^V^kf^of.

June, 1987.

PHIL il. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify thaT a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by hand-delivery, this $)0 day of June,
1987, on the following:
S. Baird Morgan, Esq
Mark J. Taylor, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
600 B o s t o n B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

84111

LA jry\%M.tr* A )(ku /n s^C r\ i inm *-wrv( £A
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AUG 1 7 »987
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J. TAYLOR, 4455
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, 4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

j1

ORDER

.

Civil No.: C85-2687
Judge Richard H. Moffat

vs.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant.

Defendant's motion to set aside judgment dated June 29, 1987
having come before the above-entitled court, the Honorable Richard
H. Moffat, District Court Judge presiding and defendant being present
in person and represented by attorney Phil Hansen, esq. and plaintiff
AMICA Mutual Insurance Company being represented by S. Baird Morgan
and Stephen J. Trayner of Strong & Hanni and said parties having
submitted their memoranda and affidavits with regard to said motion
and the court having reviewed said memoranda, affidavits and all
pleadings of record and being otherwise fully advised in the premises,
now therfore;

A19
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's
motion be and the same is hereby denied.
DATED this
lis /*7
A day of

(V^—<^£^1^

, 1987,

T
Cou

ATTEST
t t Sft&ft HINDLEY

•3y f#3#y Cfao&p1
*

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e
Order was h a n d - d e l i v e r e d t h i s
to the

|^

day of

vX-ieu t--A~

V Deputy Cle'rk

foregoing
> 1987,

following:

Phil L. Hansen
#800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
( j Q /«Dv^
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^^T

A?/

H. D.'ACN

PHIL L. HANSEN (1343)
Attorney for Defendant
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-2467
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

-v-

Civil No. C 85-2687

CARL F. SCHETTLER,

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendant.

Notice is hereby given that Carl F. Schettler, the
above-named defendant, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah from the Order denying defendant's motion to
set aside judgment signed by the Honorable Richard Moffat and
entered by the clerk of the above-entitled court on August 17,
1987.

i»iU LC

DATED thi

day of September, 1987.

'^A^l^kiM~^'

Attorney for Defendant
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

A21

IM5

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice
of Appeal was served this

day of September, 1987, on

S. Baird Morgan and Mark J. Taylor of STRONG & HANNI, attorneys
for plaintiff, Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.

Hfti/fMa
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